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THE COOPERATIVE VENTURE: REVISITING
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
ROYALTY AND WORKING
INTEREST IN TEXAS
INTRODUCTION

A.

Background

The Lessor/Lessee Relationship in the Oil and Gas Lease
The oil and gas industry has certainly evolved since "Colonel" E. L.
Drake struck oil on August 28, 1859,1 and the relationship between
the land owner and oil company has been a significant part of that
evolution. Oil companies do not typically acquire the land on which
they explore for and produce oil and gas.2 Generally, the oil company
enters into an oil and gas lease with the landowner that entitles the oil
company to the mineral rights associated with the land and to develop
the property in order to extract those minerals.' In exchange for allowing the oil company to develop the land, the landowner typically
retains a fractional royalty interest in the minerals.4 This entitles the
landowner to receive his share of the proceeds on the sale of the oil or
gas with no obligation to share in the cost of extracting the minerals
from the ground.5 If there is a large amount of oil or gas produced on
the lease, the landowner will receive a large royalty; if there is a small
amount of production, the royalty will be proportionately smaller. 6
Historically, a one-eighth royalty interest has been common,7 though
in recent years it is not uncommon to see a larger fraction negotiated. 8
The landowner generally has the right to sell his share of production
1. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE 27 (1992). The drilling leading to the discovery was done on August 27, 1859, then worked stopped for the weekend. Uncle Billy
Smith actually went to the drill site and looked down the pipe and saw oil floating on
top of the water on August 28, 1859. See id.
2. See, e.g., RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.5 (3d ed.
1991) (discussing the relationship between the lessor and lessee).
3. See id.
4. See id. The royalty interest generally is the interest retained by the landowner
who has entered into an oil and gas lease with the lessee oil company. WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, infra note 7 at 952. The working interest is the interest acquired by the
lessee and carries the burden of paying all production costs up to the point oil or gas
reaches the wellhead. See id. at 1191.
5. See id
6. This historical sharing of risk between the landowner and oil company is no
small point. It seems to point to a relationship between the two parties more accurately represented by the cooperative venture approach discussed below. Both parties benefit from good well performance or suffer from poor performance in amounts
relative to each other.
7. See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND
GAS TERMS 947 (10TH ed. 1997).
8. See id.
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separately from the oil company's sale of the remaining seven-eighths
of production by receiving his share in kind;9 however, the more common scenario is for the landowner to permit the oil company to "market" both shares.' ° That is, the oil company sells the entire "eighteighths" and passes the landowner's share to the landowner in the
form of a royalty check.
An example of a typical royalty clause in a Texas oil and gas lease is:
[T]he royalties to be paid by Lessee [oil company] are: (a) on oil,
one-eighth of that produced and saved from said land, the same to
be delivered at the wells or to the credit of Lessor [landowner] into
the pipe line to which from time to time purchase any royalty oil in
its possession, paying the market price therefor prevailing for the
field where produced on the date of purchase; (b) on gas, including
casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, produced from said
land, and sold or used off the premises.., the market value at the
well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas
sold at the wells the 11royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale.
Many of the cases discussed in this Comment, as well as overall in the
industry with respect to the royalty clause, focus on the phrases "produced and saved" and "market value at the well." Much of the litigation in Texas relating to the oil and gas industry has involved the
interpretation of those terms in the oil and gas lease. 2
The cooperative venture approach and the plain meaning approach
are two primary approaches used to interpret the terms of an oil and
gas lease. These terms are defined in more detail below. Briefly, the
cooperative venture approach assumes that the royalty and working
interest have entered into a relationship in which both parties have a
common objective of receiving the highest return possible from the
production of oil or gas from the lease. As such, an assumption is
made that both parties should be treated the same in areas such as the
price paid on oil or gas produced. The plain meaning approach simply
applies the canon of construction which states that terms of the lease
should be given the plain meaning usually applied to those terms.
B.

Statement of Position

Texas should adopt the "cooperative venture" approach with respect to the relationship between royalty and working interest owners. 3 Historically, Texas has followed the majority "plain meaning"
9. See id.
10. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 2, § 7.4.
11. Id. at 591 (emphasis added).
12. Examples are included in the discussion of cases in Part II. B., infra.
13. For purposes of this Comment, the terms working interest, lessee, and operator are synonymous. The terms royalty interest, lessor, and landowner, likewise, are
used interchangeably.
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rule.' 4 This Comment argues that the cooperative venture approach is

more consistent with the relationship between the royalty and working interest, is fairer to both parties in common areas of dispute, and
should reduce overall litigation in the oil and gas industry.
In order to avoid the extreme results of both the plain meaning and
the cooperative venture, this Comment argues for expansion of the
use of the term "constructive production"' 15 to protect both the royalty and working interests' rights. To protect the royalty interest, the
definition of constructive production should be expanded to include
situations where actual production through the well bore has not
physically occurred, but where circumstances tantamount to production have occurred.' 6 To protect the working interest, the cooperative
venture should be narrowly defined to include only those situations
where production or constructive production have occurred.' 7

Part I of this Comment defines the cooperative venture rule and the
plain meaning rule as they are used by courts to interpret oil and gas
leases. Part II, reviews and analyzes the cases adopting the coopera-

tive venture rule in our neighboring states of Oklahoma, Louisiana
and Arkansas, as well as some of the Texas cases where the plain
meaning rule has been applied. Part III, discusses the concept of constructive production and how it should be incorporated into the cooperative venture rule. As part of that discussion, this Comment
14. All but three oil and gas producing states use the plain meaning rule; however
the three which do not, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Arkansas, have significant and
long-standing oil and gas industries. Texas first applied the plain meaning rule to the
royalty clause in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968). See
detailed discussion infra Part II. B. 1.
15. Historically, the drafters of oil and gas leases have included provisions which
equate certain actions to actual production. For example, once production has begun
on the lease, it must be maintained or the lease can be lost. Drafters of oil and gas
leases have included a shut-in royalty provision which allows for the payment of shutin royalties in lieu of production (i.e., production has been temporarily stopped) to
keep the lease alive. The shut-in royalties are considered constructive production.
See HEMINGWAY, supra note 2, §6.5.
16. For example, this Comment argues that illegal drainage by an adjacent lease
which was recovered by the working interest through litigation should be considered
to be constructive production. Another example would be where oil or gas has been
extracted from the lease but not through the actual well bore. In these situations the
royalty interest's rights would be the same as had the production physically occurred
through the well bore and would no longer be available for recovery by the royalty
interest.
17. Examples of problematic questions that arise under the cooperative venture
approach appear to include whether the royalty interest has a right to share in tax
refunds or hedging gains and losses. A narrow definition of the cooperative venture
would exclude those activities because they do not represent the value of the actual
royalty share of oil or gas. This is, admittedly, a subjective call. But critics of a
broadly construed cooperative venture rightly express concern that a broadly construed rule overwhelms the historical relationship between the parties. Telephone Interview with John S. Lowe, George W. Hutchison Professor of Energy Law at
Southern Methodist University School of Law in Dallas, TX. (April 12, 1998). Limiting the rule to actual or constructive production will address much of that concern.
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addresses some of the activities of an oil and gas company which
would appear to fall outside of the definition of constructive production and, therefore, the cooperative venture. The Conclusion, summarizes the argument in favor of adopting the cooperative venture rule in
Texas. The covenants found to be implicit in an oil and gas lease are
beyond the scope of this comment; however, some of those covenants
have clearly influenced the courts that have adopted the cooperative
venture rule.1 8
I.
A.

THE DEFINITIONS

The Cooperative Venture Rule

The cooperative venture rule is, in effect, a canon of construction
which applies to interpreting oil and gas leases.' 9 Under the cooperative venture rule, there is an assumption that the royalty and working
interests have a common goal of achieving the highest price possible
for oil or gas sold from the lease.2" They have entered into a venture
in which "the lessor contribut[es] the land and the lessee contribut[es]
the capital and expertise necessary to develop the minerals for the
mutual benefit of both parties."2 1 Implicit in this venture is the "affirmative, although implied[,] obligation of the lessee to market or dispose of the product in a reasonable and prudent way to secure the
maximum benefit possible for both parties."2 2 That duty subjects the
working interest to uncertainties in the market place such as the large
price swings experienced in the industry,23 the uncertainty that a market for the product will be found (particularly in the case of natural
gas),2 4 and the possibility of the need to construct a delivery system to
transport the product to that market. The cooperative venture rule
attempts to take these uncertainties into consideration, particularly
18. Most notably, the covenant to market has influenced the adoption of the cooperative venture rule. For a discussion of the implied covenants associated with an oil
and gas lease, see HEMINGWAY, supra note 2, §§ 8.1 - 8.9.
19. See generally Tara Petroleum v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Okla. 1981)
(Although this case does not use the term cooperative venture, the analysis is in
keeping with this rule).
20. Id.
21. Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1338 (La. 1982) (citing
Thomas A. Harrell, Developments in Non Regulatory Oil & Gas Law, 30 INST. ON
OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N, 311,334 (1979) (emphasis added).
22. Id. (quoting Harrell, supra note 21).
23. See YERGIN, supra note 1, at 792.
24. Due to its physical characteristics, natural gas is transported by pipeline to the
end-user. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 790-91.
25. See, e.g., YERGIN, supra note 1, at 572 -74 (discussing the problems associated
with transporting Alaskan crude oil from the North Slope to the oil tankers off the
coast of southern Alaska).
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the implied duty to market to which the working interest is subject. a6
As Professor Lowe points out,
[T]he [cooperative] venture analysis is not substantially different
from treating the oil and gas lease as a relational contract, an agreement in which the parties are incapable of reducing important terms
of the agreement to well-defined obligations, perhaps because the
problems that the contract should address cannot be predicted accurately or because the parties are unable to agree upon solutions to
problems that may arise.27

A relational contract is one in which the parties have not attempted to
define the specifics of the contract but, rather, have established a relationship in which an implicit obligation of good faith exists to overcome problems encountered. 8 This seems to go too far in defining
the relationship between the royalty and working interest, but the cooperative venture approach does recognize the inherent uncertainties

in the oil and gas business and allows for certain unanticipated issues
to be resolved as they are encountered.
B.

9

The Plain Meaning Rule

The plain meaning rule, in the context of the relationship between
the working and royalty interest, is simply an application of the
broader plain meaning canon of construction.3 ° It means that a term
such as market value "is a 'plain term' that must be given its usual
meaning."31 In the case of a royalty clause calling for payment of the
royalty based on the "market value" of the oil or gas, that would be
"the price a willing buyer and seller would agree upon at the time of

production, irrespective of the actual amount realized by the seller
under the specific circumstances. The plain meaning rule as applied to
the interpretation of oil and gas contracts is the majority rule at this
point.3 3
26. The implied duty of the working interest to market the oil or gas is a well
established obligation of the lessee. See .HEMINGWAY, supra note 2, §§ 8.1-8.9. The
lessee has an obligation to market the product within a reasonable time and at a
reasonable price. See id. at § 8.9(C). It is the existence of this implied duty that seems
to point to the cooperative venture rule as being a fairer view of the relationship
between the parties with respect to both market price and take-or-pay settlements,
discussed more fully infra.
27. John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. Rev. 223, note 86
(1996) (citing Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,

67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1981)).
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1338.
30. See generally, Lowe, 49 SMU L. REV. at 233 (1996).
31. Id.
32. Id.

33. See Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1337-38.
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THE CASES

The Cooperative Venture Rule-Oklahoma, Louisiana
and Arkansas
1.

Tara Petroleum v. Hughey-Oklahoma

Oklahoma was the first state to adopt the cooperative venture approach through it's Supreme Court's decision in Tara Petroleum Corp.
v. Hughey.34 In that case, Tara entered into an oil and gas lease in
1973 with four heirs of William Hughey that conveyed to Tara a seveneighths working interest, with a one-eighth royalty interest retained by
the heirs.35 Six months later, Tara assigned its interest to Coy Brown,
retaining an overriding royalty of one-eighth of the seven-eighths
working interest and reserving the right to purchase any gas produced
at 31 cents per Mcf.3 6 Through various other assignments, the lease
ultimately was held by Brown's corporation, Wilcoy, and several individuals.3 7 A producing gas well was drilled in 1976, and Wilcoy entered into a gas purchase contract with Jarrett Oil Company as
buyer.3 " Wilcoy terminated the contract in 1978. 39 During the two
year period, Jarrett paid Wilcoy 32 cents per Mcf the first year and 33
cents per Mcf the second year.40 Jarrett sold the gas it had purchased
from Wilcoy to El Paso Natural Gas (El Paso) at the Federal Power
Commission ceiling price which approached $1.30 per Mcf during that
period.4 To simplify, the working interest lessee sold the gas produced to Jarrett, the purchaser, under a gas purchase contract and
paid the royalty interest based on that price. Jarrett sold the gas to El
Paso at a much higher price. Jarrett had no direct relationship to the
royalty owners. The royalty owners sued all of the working interest
owners, claiming additional royalties. 42 They pointed to the lease
which stated in part that the "lessee covenants and agrees... [t]o pay
'4 3
lessor for gas ... at the market price at the well for the gas sold."
The lessors claimed they were entitled to royalties based on the price
El Paso paid Jarrett because it indicated the true market value at the
time the gas was sold.44
The question before the court was whether the "contract price," i.e.
the price the working interest lessee gets according to the gas
34. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
35. See id. at 1271.
36. See id. Mcf stands for one thousand cubic feet, a common unit of measure of
gas volume in the industry. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 611.
37. See Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Okla. 1981).
38. See id.

39. See id.
40. See id.

41.
42.
43.
44.

See id.
See id. at 1272.
Id.
See id.
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purchase contract, should be used to define the "market price" under
the lease. a5 The court held that it should. a6 The court stated that the
royalty interest was only entitled to royalties based on the actual price
the working interest lessee had realized from Jarrett, not the apparent
true market price based on the third party transaction between Jarrett
and El Paso. In so holding, the court noted that the lessee is under an
implied duty to the royalty interest to market the gas.4 7 To meet that
obligation, the lessee often must enter into long-term purchase contracts at prices below current or eventual market prices.48 The court
recognized the inequity of requiring the lessee to market the gas
under the implied duty to the royalty interest to market and allowing
the royalty interest to receive a royalty based on a higher price. 9
Though the term cooperative venture was not yet used, this is the first
decision, which adopted the concept that the working and royalty interests rode in the same car, so to speak, in this venture.
2. Henry v. Ballard & Cordell-Louisiana
In the 1982 case, Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp.,50 Louisiana became the second state to adopt the cooperative venture rule. In
Henry, the issue again was the price used to calculate the royalty on
gas production.5 1 The lessee had entered into a twenty-year gas
purchase contract in 1961 that allowed for price escalations over the
term of the contract.12 In 1976, the market price of gas began to exceed the contract price even after escalations. 3 The oil and gas lease
included language similar to that found in Tara, which called for royalties based on the market price of the gas sold or used.5 4 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals holding that the
royalty should be based on the price realized by the lessee on the sale
of the gas.55 Noting that it had not followed the majority rule, the
court stated:
Although the majority of jurisdictions have interpreted the ambiguity in the royalty provisions against the lessee, they have done so by

ignoring the practical realities of the oil and gas industry, and the
obligations of the lessee to market the gas at the best possible price
at the time the leases were made.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See
See
See
See
See
418
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id. at 1273.
id. at 1274.
So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
id. at 1335.
id. at 1335-36.
id. at 1336.
id. at 1335 (comparing leases in Tara and Henry).
id. at 1337.
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The practical and economic necessities of the oil and gas industry at
the time the leases were negotiated are given little or no considera-

tion in the line of cases represented by Vela.56 Because such factors
necessarily would have bearing upon the intent of the parties concerning payment of royalties, the result reached in those cases has
been greatly criticized.57
The court used the term cooperative venture to define this relationship
between the working and royalty interest.58 It drew heavily on the
Tara decision, noting that the interpretation of market value as the
price realized by the working interest lessee is the only interpretation
fair to both parties.59
3.

Hillard v. Stephens-Arkansas

In a decision announced just ten days after Henry, the Arkansas
Supreme Court addressed the definition of market value in the royalty
clause in Hillard v. Stephens.6" In Hillard, the court addressed a fact

scenario similar to Tara and Henry. Beginning in February 1957, the
Hillards, as lessors, entered into seven gas leases with Stephens, five
of which included a royalty clause stating, "Lessee shall pay Lessor as
royalty gas the equal one-eighth.., of the value of such gas calculated
at .. .Prevailing Market Price at Well. ...."61 Two of the leases

62
included a royalty clause calling for royalties at seven cents per Mcf.
Up until 1970, the royalties were paid based on the net proceeds received by Stephens from its purchaser, Ark-La.6 3 In 1970, Stephens
began paying the royalties based on a set amount of approximately
sixteen cents but could not explain why.6 4 The Hillards accepted
those royalties without complaint until 1979 when they filed suit for
additional royalties based on current market prices at the time the gas
was sold.65 Again, to simplify, the Hillards' royalty had been paid
based on the proceeds received by Stephens or some set royalty price
but not on the apparent market value indicated by the price for which
Ark-La sold the gas to its end user. Both parties appealed decisions

by the lower courts.6 6

56. The court is referring to Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.
1968). The Vela case is the Texas case that first used the plain meaning rule with
respect to the definition of market price in the royalty clause. It is discussed further
below, Part II. B. 1.
57. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1337-38.
58. See id. at 1338.
59. See id. at 1339 (quoting Tara Petroleum Corp., 630 P.2d 1273-74).
60. 637 S.W.2d 581 (Ark. 1982).
61. Id. at 582.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. The exact amount is not relevant to the issue other than the fact that it
was below what the Stephenses argue was the true market value.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 583.
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On appeal, the Hillards contended "with respect to the first five of
the leases, they [were] ... entitled to a royalty computed on the cur-

rent market value of the gas in the field determined on a daily basis
the moment the gas is produced and/or delivered to Ark-La under the
gas purchase contracts. '67 The court held that, instead, the royalty
should be based on the gas purchase contract price, not the current
market price. 68 The court stated:
The gas lease constitutes a present sale of all of the gas in place at
the time such lease is executed, and as the gas leaves the well head,

the entire ownership thereof is in the lessee, none being reserved in
the lessor. Once the lessee-producer drills a well resulting in the
commercial production of natural gas on the leased premises, the
lessee-producer has the immediate duty to market the gas. In order
to market such gas effectively, it is the custom in the industry[,] and
is usually necessary[,] for the lessee-producer to sell the gas under a
long-term gas purchase contract.69

The Hillard Court also noted that using the gas purchase contract
price to calculate the royalty "is the only interpretation that operates
fairly for the [lessee] .

..

[and] is not unfair to the [lessor]." 7 °

These three decisions all focus on the inequity of requiring the
lessee to market gas under an implied duty, which, at the time of these
cases, could often only be achieved through a low price long-term contract and requiring that the royalty be paid at a higher market price.
All three courts found that the cooperative venture rule more closely
reflects the intent of the parties in the lease and results in a more
equitable treatment of both parties.
4. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co.-Louisiana
Conceptually, the cooperative venture rule can be applied to other
interactions between the royalty and working interest as well. One
such interaction receiving the attention of courts recently is the division of proceeds on settlement of take-or-pay obligations or litigation.
The circumstances in the natural gas industry in the 1970s and 1980s
contributed greatly to the amount of litigation in the industry. 71 Buyers of natural gas in the 1970s were anxious to enter into contracts
with producers due to the energy crisis.72 However, during the 1980s,
gas prices declined sharply. 73 The pipelines found themselves in a situation where they were contractually obligated to pay much higher
prices under the take-or-pay contract than they could sell the gas for
67. Id.

68.
69.
70.
71.
1998).

See id.
Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 585.
See

JOSEPH SHADE, PRIMER ON THE TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS

51 (2d ed.

72. See id.
73. See id.
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at market prices.7 4 Many simply defaulted on their contracts.75 Approximately $44 billion in claims were filed by the producing companies, and ultimately, about $8 billion in settlements were reached.76
Many of the lessees who had settled these claims refused to pass on
any portion of the proceeds to the royalty interest, claiming that no
actual production had occurred.
The majority rule is that the royalty interest does not have a right to
share in take-or-pay settlements or litigation.77 This rule is based on
the theory that actual production has not occurred. 8 However, in the
1992 decision, Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co.,79 the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the royalty interest is, in fact, entitled to share in
those proceeds.
In Frey, Amoco had settled a take-or-pay claim against its pipeline
purchaser, Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., but did not pass on any
of the proceeds to the lessors as royalties.8" The lessors sued Amoco,
claiming underpayment of royalties. 81 The trial court found for
Amoco, citing Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel,82 probably "the most cited case holding that royalty owners are not entitled to
share in these take or pay settlements."83 Frey appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which reversed, stating
that "take-or-pay payments are part of the 'amount realized' from the
sale of gas under the Lease, and thus such payments, received by the
lessee in settlement of the take-or-pay dispute with its pipeline purchaser for gas not taken, are subject to the lessor's royalty."' On
petition for rehearing, the Fifth Circuit withdrew the portion of the
opinion relating to the take-or-pay settlement and certified the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court.85
The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court, which
had "determined 'it would be contrary to the nature of the Lease as a
cooperative venture to allow a benefit by any name that is attributable
to the gas under the leased premises to inure exclusively to the
lessee.'" 8 6 Addressing the take-or-pay issue, the court stated:
Accordingly we look not at the parties' intent to provide expressly
for take-or-pay payments, but rather at the parties general intent in
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. n.73.
77. See id. at 51-52.
78. See id. at 52.
79. 603 So.2d 166 (La. 1992).
80. See id. at 169.
81. See id.
82. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
83. SHADE, supra note 70, at 51.
84. Frey, 603 So.2d at 170.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 170 (quoting Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 943 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1991))
(emphasis added).
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entering an oil and gas lease, viz., the lessor supplies the land and
the lessee the capital and expertise necessary to develop the land for
the mutual benefit of both parties. In this manner the royalty clause
is given an expansive reading, reflecting the mutuality of objectives
87
and sharing of benefits inherent in the lessee-lessor relationship.

The court found that, under the cooperative venture view of the relationship between the working and royalty interest, the royalty interest
was entitled to share in take-or-pay settlements.88 It expressly
avoided deciding whether recoupable and nonrecoupable take-or-pay
payments should be distinguished.89 But this is an important distinction. With recoupable payments, there will likely be production at
some point in the future, and a royalty will be paid based upon the
actual proceeds realized by the working interest. A nonrecoupable
payment, in theory, is not related to any identifiable production of
natural gas, now or in the future. But the reality is it may be a part of
a negotiated settlement where the future price of gas delivered is low-

ered in return.' This is a situation where the concept of constructive
production could be applied.9 ' While no actual production has occurred, the amount realized by the working interest relates to circumstances, which are tantamount to production. Clearly, the royalty
interest will realize a smaller royalty in the future due to the negotiated price resulting from the nonrecoupable take-or-pay settlement in
that case.
B.

The Plain Meaning Rule - Texas

1.

Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Vela

The case establishing the "market price at the wellhead" rule in
Texas is Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Vela.92 In Vela, the case involved

a gas lease executed in 1933, covering 1,500 acres of land in Zapata
County.9 3 The lease included a typical royalty clause that required
87. Id. at 172-73 (emphasis added).
88. See id. at 182.
89. See id. A recoupable payment would be one where the pipeline could receive
gas at a later date, without charge, up to the amount already paid under the take-orpay provision (i.e. the amount paid for not taking the gas previously). See WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 7, at 898. A recoupable payment affects the royalty interest
only to the extent of the time value of money if a royalty is paid when the recoupment
occurs, since the lessee had received payment when the previous take-or-pay payment
was made. A nonrecoupable payment would not be specifically tied to any particular
sales volume upon which the royalty would normally be based. See id. at 704.
90. This is the situation in Condra v. Quinoco, 954 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1997, writ denied) discussed in Part II. B. 5., infra.
91. See discussion infra Part III of constructive production as it relates to the cooperative venture. Simply stated, constructive production should be inferred whenever the royalty interest's rights in the underlying reserves have been impacted
regardless of whether actual physical production has occurred.
92. 429 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. 1968).
93. See id.
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the lessee to "pay to lessor, as royalty for gas from each well where
gas only is found, while the same is being sold or used off of the premises, one-eighth of the market price at the wells of the amount so sold
or used."9 4 The lessors sued for additional royalties some thirty years

later when the market price of the gas had gone up.95 The trial court
held for the plaintiffs, ordering Texas Oil and Gas Corp. to pay additional royalties to the Velas.96 The appeals court affirmed, and the
Texas Supreme Court accepted the case for review.
At the time of the original lease, there was only one purchaser
available, United Gas Public Service Company, which had built the
pipeline to the producing gas wells. 97 The court noted that "United

was the only commercial purchaser of gas in the field. The operators
could market their gas only on a 'life of the lease' basis, and the price
stipulated is the only price that could be obtained at that time."98 In
finding for the Velas, the court stated:
It is clear then that the parties knew how to, and did, provide for
royalties payable in kind, based upon market price or market value,
and based upon the proceeds derived by the lessee from the sale of
gas. They might have agreed that the royalty on gas produced from
a gas well would be a fractional part of the amount realized by the
lessee from its sale. Instead of doing so, however, they stipulated in
plain terms that the lessee would pay one-eighth of the market price

at the well of all gas sold or used off the premises. This clearly
99
means the prevailing market price at the time of the sale or use.
The court recognized that the parties could have provided for royalties in-kind. 100 It then proceeded to ignore the implication that no inkind royalties were provided for. That is, the parties did not intend to
market the royalty share separately. The Velas did not sell their share
of production at the market price; 1 . all of the production was sold by
the lessee at the long-term contract price.10 2 It is unlikely that an oil
and gas company intended to include in a gas lease that the royalty
interest was entitled to a higher price than the producer could obtain
under the circumstances. 10 3 The court's interpretation of the "market
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 870.
Id.
Id. at 871 (emphasis added).
In-kind royalties are royalties paid out in actual production. See WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 7, at 952. The royalty interest receives its actual share of production and finds its own buyer. In that situation, the royalty interest could, in fact, sell
its share at a price different from the long-term contract price realized by the working
interest.
101. See Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. 1968).
102. See id.
103. Producers could not reasonably be expected to agree to pay market prices on
an eighth or more of production considering the large swings in oil and gas prices over
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265

price" term results, in effect, in Texas Oil and Gas Corp. purchasing
the royalty interest's production at the higher market price, then reselling it at the lower long-term contract price. That "plain meaning"
interpretation of the term results in a lease agreement lessees would
not have been likely to sign, much less author. The cooperative venture approach would seem to result in a more equitable treatment of
both parties under the circumstances.
2.

Exxon Corp. v. Middleton

Another well-known Texas case where the plain meaning rule was
invoked is Exxon Corp. v. Middleton.'°4 In this case, Exxon had entered into oil and gas leases with Middleton and others between 1933
and 1935.1"5 The royalty clauses in the leases stated that royalties:
on gas.., produced from said land and sold or used off the premises
... shall be the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so
°6
sold or used, provided that on gas realized
so sold atfrom
the such
wells sale.
the royalties
amount
the
of
one-eighth
be
shall
Some of the gas produced was processed at Exxon's plant which was
located in the Anahuac Field where the wells were located but not on
the actual lease. °7 Exxon argued that the sales should be considered
on the premises with the royalty based on the amount realized.' 0 8
Middleton argued that the Exxon plant is not located on the leased
premises, and, therefore, the royalty should be based on market price,
not the price realized by Exxon.' 01 Exxon relied on Butler v. Exxon
Corp.,"' in which "at the well" was interpreted to mean anywhere in
the vicinity of the field. 1 ' The court disapproved of the Butler interpretation of the clause and held that the sales at the tailgate of the
plant" 2 should be interpreted as taking place off the premises."3
Under the Middleton leases, that would entitle Middleton to royalties
the history of the industry if they were not realizing those prices on the sale. In this
particular case, if the market price had risen another $.05 to $.184 per Mcf, the lessee
would actually lose money on every Mcf produced after paying the royalty. While

another established canon of construction is to hold ambiguities against the party creating the ambiguities, application of that canon in these cases seems to overwhelm
both the intent of the parties and common sense. See Hitson v. Gilman, 220 S.W.2d
140, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, 1920).
104. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).

105. See id. at 241.
106. Id. at 241-42 (emphasis added).
107. See id. at 242.
108. See id.
109. See id.

110. 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
111. Exxon, 613 S.W.2d at 243-44.

112. "At the tailgate of the plant" simply means that the gas is sold after it has been

processed by the plant, a process that removes hydrocarbon liquids such as propane
from the gas for sale as a separate product. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7,

at 1068.
113. See Exxon, 613 S.W.2d at 244.
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on the market value of the gas rather than the amount realized by
Exxon.
This decision appears to be in keeping with the plain meaning rule
as adopted in Vela. The troublesome aspect of the decision is the fact
that the "market value" term used with respect to sales off the premises was written into the leases some 35 years prior to Vela. Common
sense would seem to tell us that the term was not included because
Exxon wanted to be sure Middleton received market price for sales
off the premises, somehow distinguishing between those sales and
sales at the well. There is simply no business reason for Exxon to have
done so. The more obvious reason for inclusion of the term is to
make clear to the royalty interest that it would be responsible for its
share of any processing and transportation costs incurred to get the
gas from the well to the ultimate purchaser in a salable form. While
the royalty is not responsible for the cost of production, it is responsible for those types of post-production costs. 1 14 "Market value at the
well" more likely
was intended to mean the sale price less post-pro115
duction costs.
3. Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank
In a curious and widely criticized decision in 1996, Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank,1 6 the Texas Supreme Court used the
plain meaning rule to find that, even though the lease stated clearly
that the royalty interest was not required to pay its share of the cost of
transportation and related expenses, the plain meaning interpretation
of the lease was that the royalty owner was, in fact, required to pay
those costs. 117 In Heritage, NationsBank was the trustee for royalty
owners of leases in which Heritage was the lessee. The royalty clauses
in the three leases at issue had similar wording. One such representative clause stated:
[T]he royalties to be paid Lessor are... (b) on gas.., sold or used
off the premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other products
therefrom, the market value at the well of 1/5 of the gas so sold or
used ... provided, however, that there shall be no deductions from

the value of the Lessor's royalty by reason of any required process114. See, e.g., Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex.
1996) (noting that royalties are subject to post production cost but not cost of
production).
115. See id. For example, if the gas were sold for $2.00 per Mcf at the plant tailgate,
including liquids, and the cost to transport and process the gas to that point were $.25
per Mcf, then the market price at the wellhead would be $1.75 per Mcf. The royalty
would be based on $1.75 per Mcf, not $2.00. It seems that the key terms are "at the
well" when assessing the intent of the parties.
116. 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996).
117. See id.
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ing, dehydration,118compression, transportationor other matter to

market such gas.
NationsBank noticed that Heritage was, in fact, deducting transportation costs from the royalty share and sued to recover.119 In overruling
the court of appeals holding for NationsBank, the Texas Supreme
Court relied on a definition of."market value at the well" which "involves subtracting reasonable post-production marketing costs from
the market value at the point of sale."' ° The court held that the postproduction clause was "surplusage as a matter of law."''
Because
that definition of market value at the well was inconsistent with the
"no deductions" part of the royalty clause, the court held that Heritage could deduct transportation costs despite the express language to
the contrary in the lease.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to address the apparent
problems with the Heritage decision. It is not a case where the cooperative venture rule would result in a better decision because the dispute involved express terms of the lease which would override the
cooperative venture rule. It does, however, serve as an example of the
anomalies that can result from application of the plain meaning rule.
4.

TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Finkelstein

The Texas Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether the royalty
interest is entitled to share in take-or-pay settlements. One court of
appeals decision addressing the issue is TransAmerican Natural Gas
Corp. v. Finkelstein.'2 In Finkelstein, TransAmerican assigned to Finkelstein a one-sixteenth overriding royalty interest 2 3 in any properties
that Finkelstein acquired for TransAmerican. 24 Finkelstein was required to sell his share of the gas through TransAmerican under a gas
purchase agreement. 125 TransAmerican entered into a long-term gas
purchase contract with El Paso Natural Gas ("El Paso"), a large pipeline and utility, requiring El Paso to take all of the gas produced from
a field in which TransAmerican (and Finkelstein, through its association with TransAmerican) held mineral interests or pay eighty percent
of the amount not taken.'2 6 El Paso received a five-year recoupment
118. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 122. This is the definition the author suggests should have been inferred
by the court in Middleton supra Part II. B. 2.
121. Id. at 123.
122. 933 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied)
123. As noted by the Finkelstein court, "[A]n overriding royalty is an interest
carved out of, and constituting a part of, the working interest created by an oil and gas
lease. Id. at 594, n.1 (citing Gruss v. Cummins, 329 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
124. See id. at 593-94.
125. See id. at 594.
126. See id,

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

15

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 5 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 6

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

right entitling it to take gas it had paid for previously under the "pay"
provision of the take-or-pay contract.'27
In 1983, and in response to the market conditions discussed supra in
Part I. A. 4., El Paso "filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to
avoid the take-or-pay provision of its gas purchase contract with
TransAmerican. TransAmerican counterclaimed for underpayment of
'
Also in 1983,
gas and for breach of the take-or-pay provision." 128
TransAmerican filed for bankruptcy and, in 1987, settled Finkelstein's
claims for unpaid royalties and breach of the gas purchase agreement. 12 9 In 1990, TransAmerican and El Paso settled their claims for
cash and property valued at $360 million to be paid to TransAmerican. 130 Included in the settlement was termination of El Paso's recoupment of make-up rights.' 3 ' TransAmerican had paid Finkelstein
royalties based on the spot market price of gas sold during the period
from the settlement between TransAmerican and Finkelstein up to the
date that the El Paso settlement effectively terminated Finkelstein's
interest in the properties involved. 132 Once again, to simplify, TransAmerican realized at least part of the benefit of the take-or-pay contract price through the settlement reached with El Paso but only paid
Finkelstein his royalty based on the lower spot market prices received
on the actual sale of the gas. TransAmerican refused to pass any of
the El Paso settlement on to Finkelstein, who sued for the difference
between the royalty based on the spot price during that period and the
take-or-pay contract price.'33 The trial court held for Finkelstein and
awarded approximately $8 million in actual damages and35another $4.5
million in attorneys' fees.13 TransAmerican appealed.
With respect to Finkelstein's right to receive a royalty, the court of
appeals pointed to the plain meaning rule as established in Vela and
further defined in NationsBank.1 36 The court stated "Finkelstein's
lease is tied to production. By this language, Finkelstein unambiguously limited his right to royalty payments from gas actually extracted
from the land."'1 3 7 The court was not persuaded by Finkelstein's argument that the termination of El Paso's recoupment rights should entitle him to receive a royalty on the settlement proceeds. 138 The court
noted that $536 million of the original court award to TransAmerican
127. See id. El Paso would then pay the difference between the take-or-pay pay-

ment and the delivery price. See id.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id. at 594-95.
id.
id. at 595.

135. See id.
136. See id. at 597.
137. Id. at 598 (footnote omitted).
138. See id. at 599.
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prior to settlement with El Paso was for repudiation damages for the
period when El Paso took no gas and, therefore, there was no royalty
due on gas not taken. 13 9 That is, the repudiation damages were to
recompense TransAmerican for El Paso's failure to meet its "pay" obligation under the contract when it did not "take" the gas, not for
actual production sold to El Paso. But it seems that the substance of
what occurred was TransAmerican effectively received something
above the spot market price on which it paid Finkelstein's royalty. In
keeping with the cooperative venture model argued for in this Comment, this would be a situation where the take-or-pay settlement proceeds can be so closely associated with the royalty interest's rights in
the underlying reserves that constructive production should be inferred. TransAmerican has an implied duty to obtain the highest reasonable price and has done so with the El Paso contract. Under the
cooperative venture view of the implied duty to market, TransAmerican should not be held liable to Finkelstein for entering into a longterm contract if the market price goes up subsequently. Conversely, it
seems only fair that Finkelstein should participate in any proceeds resulting from that long-term contract.
5.

Condra v. Quinoco

In a 1997 San Antonio Court of Appeals case, Condra v. Quinoco,140 the court heard a case involving a royalty owner's claim to
part of a take-or-pay settlement. In Condra, the lessee, Quinoco, had
entered into a long-term gas contract with El Paso which included a
take-or-pay clause. The contract called for El Paso to pay the federally-regulated rate of $6.32 per unit 141 versus the spot price of $1.20
per unit. El Paso refused to take gas under the contract for a four
year period, and Quinoco filed suit.142 Ultimately, El Paso and Quinoco settled. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, El Paso
was to pay Quinoco a recoupable payment of $3.5 million and a
nonrecoupable payment of $2.3 million. 143 According to the court:
[T]he recoupable payment was a prepayment for approximately one
billion cubic feet of gas to be delivered in the future. The
nonrecoupable payment was consideration for certain amendments
to the Gas Purchase Agreement and settlement of other claims, one
139.
140.
141.
of the

See id.
954 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
The unit being MMBTU, or Million British Thermal Units, which is a measure
heat content in gas. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 225. This

measurement is generally upon which the price is based. Telephone Interview with
Steve Estes, Gas Marketing Manager of Union Pacific Resources, Fort Worth, Tex.
(April 14, 1999). One Mcf of gas will generally have an MMBTU content of plus or
minus 1000. See, e.g., WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 225.

142. Condra v. Quinico Petroleum, Inc., 954 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1997)
143. See id. at 70.
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of which was identified as1 4 4El Paso's failure to take rateably [sic]
from the appellees' wells.

The contract was amended to, among other provisions, remove the
145
pricing and take-or-pay provisions.
Quinoco refused to share any of the settlement with the royalty
owner, Condra, who then filed suit. The court of appeals held for
Quinoco, finding that the settlement did not represent proceeds on
production. The majority opinion relied heavily on TransAmerican
Natural Gas Corp. V. Finkelstein.46 In a dissenting opinion in Quinoco, Justice Rickhoff quotes Williamson v. Elf Acquitaine,4 7 a Mis-

sissippi district court decision holding for the royalty owner under
similar circumstances, stating:
[T]he court held that "a court's finding that nonrecoupable settlements are indeed royalty-bearing, based on the fact that production
has occurred, is consistent with the Texas court's literal interpretations of the lease language." The court noted that this interpretation of the lease takes into account "the practical realities of the gas
market" and infuses "an examination of the equities of
148settlements
within an interpretation of the lease language itself.",
The effect of the nonrecoupable payment to Quinoco is to adjust the
price ultimately realized on the sale of gas. The working interest reaps
the benefit of the settlement and effectively prevents the royalty interest from receiving full proceeds on the sale. The court implicitly states
that production has occurred,'149 but refuses to relate the settlement to
that production.
The court in Condra takes a form over substance position in finding
that the take-or-pay settlement is not tied to actual production. For
the working interest to receive a higher price for gas than the royalty
interest on the same production would clearly be inconsistent with the
royalty clause.' 5 0 As demonstrated in Condra, the settlements, in substance, are clearly linked to the lessor's rights in the underlying
reserves in some cases, and the court should adopt a standard of constructive production to protect the lessor's interest. One Texas court
144. Id.
145. See id.

146. 933 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
147. 925 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Miss. 1996) This case has been reversed by the

5th

Circuit in Williamson v. Elf Acquitaine 98 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1998). However, refer-

ence here is merely to help frame the argument.
148. Condra, 954 S.W.2d at 74 (quoting Williamson, 925 F. Supp. at 1170 (N.D.
Miss. 1996)).
149. See id. at 70. The nonrecoupable payment, like in the Finkelstein case, effectively results in Quinoco being paid a higher price for production not taken by El
Paso than what Condra's royalty is based on.
150. See e.g., note 12, supra.
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has agreed with Condra.151 The issue has not yet been decided by the
Texas Supreme Court.
6.

Neel v. HECI

In Neel v. HECI Exploration Co.,152 the Austin Court of Appeals
decided a case in which the working interest operator had been
awarded monetary damages against AOP, an operator of an adjacent
lease. AOP was accused of over production in violation of Texas Railroad Commission proration orders.' 53 HECI Exploration Company

(HECI) claimed that AOP had damaged the reservoir by its over production resulting in lost reserves for HECI. 15 4 HECI did not inform
the Neel family, the lessors of the property involved, of the dispute,
trial, or subsequent award levied against AOP. 155 When the Neels
learned of it four years later, they sued HECI for their one-sixth royalty share of the award.' 5 6

The court noted that the Neels were entitled to one sixth of the oil
produced.157 However, it then referred to the earlier Texas case, Rogers v. Osborn, 58 to define production as "oil physically extracted from
the ground, and, therefore, the Neels were not, as a matter of law,
' 59
entitled to a share of HECI's recovery from AOP as a royalty.'

The Rogers case simply did not define production in that way, 160 but
regardless, the Rogers case involved an entirely different issue. In that
case, the court was addressing whether production had actually occurred in order to hold a lease.161 The actual physical extraction of
the oil was the central issue in that case. 1 62 In Neel, the question
before the court was not whether oil was physically extracted (AOP

saw to it that it was not), the question was whether the Neels were
151. See Alameda Corp. v. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp., No. 14-96-00044CV (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], March 27, 1997, n.w.h.).
152. 942 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997) rev'd on other grounds, 982 S.W.2d
881 (Tex. 1998). The Texas Supreme Court overruled the Austin Court of Appeals,
holding that "there is no implied covenant that requires a lessee to give notice of its
intent to sue an adjoining operator because such a duty is not necessary to effectuate
the full purpose of the lease and is not clearly within the contemplation of the parties
that they deemed it necessary to express it." Id. at 881-82. This decision is consistent
with earlier Texas history of applying the plain meaning rule. Much of this Comment's analysis of the Austin Court of Appeals' decision is equally applicable.
153. Pro ratio orders are directives issued by the Texas Railroad Commission to set
production allowances for specific leases in order to regulate statewide production of
oil and gas reserves and protect adjacent leases. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 7, at 1102.
154. See Neel, 942 S.W.2d at 215.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id at 216.
158. 261 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1953).
159. Neel, 942 S.W.2d at 217.
160. See Rogers, 261 S.W.2d at 312. In Rogers, the court defined production as
"marketable oil or gas." See id. (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942)).
161. See id.
162. See id.
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entitled to a share of monetary damages relating to oil production
which they now could never receive.163 The court ultimately arrived
at the conclusion that HECI owed the Neels an implied duty to inform
them of the case under the theory of implied covenant to protect the
lease."6 The Neel court specifically rejected the theories of unjust enrichment and negligent misrepresentation.165 While the end result of
the decision appears correct,16 6 the court again used a narrow definition of production to find that the Neels were not entitled to their
royalty share under the royalty clause.
Clearly, the proceeds received by HECI from the litigation were
based on the amount of reserves drained by AOP. The fact that the
reserves did not actually exit through HECI's wellhead, but instead
through AOP's, should not mean the Neels were not entitled to their
share of the value of proceeds received by HECI. The reserves in
which the Neels owned a royalty interest were removed from the reservoir, and HECI effectively was paid for those reserves. It is simply
semantic hair-splitting for the court to find that actual production had
not occurred. Under the cooperative venture model as defined in this
comment, the court could have found that constructive production
had occurred and awarded the Neels their royalty share without needing to refer to the implied covenants or unjust enrichment. The circumstances surrounding a drainage case seem to represent possibly
the best example of circumstances equivalent to actual production
where the concept of constructive production could be applied.
III.

CONSTRUCTIVE PRODUCTION AND ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF
THE COOPERATIVE VENTURE

A.

Constructive Production

As noted in the example provided at footnote 11 above, the typical
royalty clause in a Texas oil and gas lease refers to a royalty due on oil
or gas "produced and saved from said land." Many of the decisions
discussed above where Texas courts have applied the plain meaning
rule have included a holding that production has not occurred because
physical extraction from the lease has not taken place. Under the cooperative venture model argued for in this Comment, Texas should
expand the definition of constructive production. As noted in footnote 15 above, the term is typically used in the case of shut-in royalties
where payment is made in lieu of actual production. It seems clear
that there are circumstances where the royalty interest's rights in the
underlying reserves have been affected even though actual physical
extraction has not occurred. Drainage by an adjacent lease, as oc163.
164.
165.
166.

See Neel, 942 S.W.2d at 215.
See id. at 218.
See id.
And by implication, the Supreme Court's ruling does not appear to be correct.
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curred in Neel, would be a clear example because the actual reserves
have been lost. But even where only the price to be realized has been
affected, as in the case of negotiated price changes involving nonrecoupable take-or-pay settlements, it is clear that the royalty interest's rights in the reserves have been affected. Under the cooperative
venture model, circumstances affecting the value of the royalty interest's rights in the reserves would trigger his right to participate in the
proceeds, not just actual physical production.
B. Other Activities
However, there appear to be circumstances where the cooperative
venture rule should be narrowly construed. Oil and gas companies
participate in options and futures markets in order to hedge against
price swings. 167 These transactions are sufficiently distinct from production and marketing of Oil and gas that it would seem equitable to
exclude the royalty interest from the gains, as well as the losses, of
those transactions. For example, options contracts have no relationship to actual production of the company. They are, often by definition, contracts relating to production of other oil or gas purchased on a
commodity exchange. They are virtually never settled in the actual
transfer of oil or gas, and no ownership of existing reserves is required
to enter into many of the contracts. There would be no practical way
to assign gains and losses on those transactions to actual production
carrying a royalty burden.
Another such activity would be transactions related to federal and
state income taxes. The tax credits allowed for certain drilling activities 168 are realized as the underlying reserves are produced; however,
the credit itself results from risks that the working interest bore alone.
These credits are clearly associated with drilling activities for which
the royalty interest has no obligation to participate. It would seem
fair that they accrue only to the working interest. It is certainly possible that a tax credit could be provided for an activity that affects the
royalty owner. An unlikely possibility might be a credit for not producing, similar to crop subsidies. This would clearly penalize the royalty interest if it were not permitted to share in the credit. But this
Comment argues that an activity should meet the threshold of qualifying as constructive production in order to be deemed part of the cooperative venture. To do otherwise would make the rule unworkable
and unfair to the working interest.
CONCLUSION

Texas courts appear to be going out of their way to ignore the substance of transactions involving royalty interests. In the situations de167. For example, one major independent exploration and production company financial audit client of the author hedged up to fifty percent of its following year production to lock in a more stable price.
168. For example, I.R.C. § 29 tax credits allowed for drilling coal seam gas wells.
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scribed above, the courts have found that the royalty interest was
entitled to a price at which the related production was not actually
sold and refused to find that a royalty interest owner was entitled to
share in proceeds, which in substance were clearly related to production at the well. It is simply inconsistent with the nature of oil and gas
operations to entitle the royalty interest to a different price than the
working interest realizes on the actual sale of the underlying reserves.
The working interest is not purchasingthe royalty interests share; it is
marketing the royalty interests share. In order to ensure a consistent
buyer, at times those marketing efforts include entering into long-term
contracts, often at prices below spot prices. The royalty interest is
entitled to market its share if it feels it can realize a higher price. In
fact, some oil companies with royalty or override interests do just
that.' 69 To allow the royalty interest the higher of market price at the
wellhead or actual proceeds would seem to shift all of the risk of price
to the working interest.
Allowing the working interest to keep all proceeds on litigation and
settlements where the proceeds relate to reserves owned by the royalty interest seems to be equally unfair. If the end result is that the
working interest realized a higher price than the royalty interest on
the same reserves, then, regardless of the steps involved to arrive at
that point, the royalty owner has not been treated consistently with
the lease agreement.
The adoption of the Vela plain meaning rule, combined with some
suspect interpretations as to what was the plain meaning in given
cases, seem to have resulted in decisions which have been unfair to
either the working or royalty interest. The plain meaning rule unnecessarily puts the working interest and royalty interest in conflicting
positions and encourages litigation. The cooperative venture rule followed in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana, three states with significant oil and gas industries, appears to be more representative of the
substance of the agreements and nature of the industry. It is clearly
more fair to all of the parties involved.
The Texas Supreme Court should reverse years of dubious decisions
by adopting the cooperative venture approach. To provide a fairer
and more practical application of the rule, the court should expand
the definition of constructive production to cover circumstances
where events equivalent to production have occurred but limit the cooperative venture to actual and constructive production. Activities
clearly not related to the royalty interest's share of the underlying
reserves should be excluded from the cooperative venture.
Douglas R. Johnson
169. The author has worked with several companies who held royalty interests in
wells operated by the author's employer where the royalty interest took its share inkind in order to market its own oil.
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